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Abstract: This paper is a study of how the people at the centre of
the violent conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces have
been represented, with particular reference to the period from
the Second World War to the present. It provides a brief
historical background to a number of discourses of identity
regarding the people in the region. It focuses on the struggle
between competing discourses of Thai national identity, Malay ethnic
identity, Muslim identity, and a more localized identity centred on
the memory of the former sultanate of Patani and its associated
linguistic and cultural traditions.
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In January 2004, a centuries-old conflict in Thailand’s southern border
provinces broke out once again. Over 2,000 people have been killed,
the number of attacks has been increasing and the nature of the violence is
intensifying. While in the past the main targets of militants were
military and security officials, the current violence has targeted
teachers, government officials, religious leaders and villagers – both
Buddhist and Muslim – tourists, even women and children. Despite an
escalation in the violence, it is still unclear who is leading the
insurgency and what their political demands are. At present, it is South
East Asia’s most violent insurgency.1
1 For the fullest recent analysis of the conflict, see Critical Asian Studies (2006), Vol
18, No 2, Thematic Issue: Patani Merdeka – Thailand’s Southern Fire, and an up-
dated version of the same group of essays in Duncan McCargo, ed (2007), Rethinking
Thailand’s Southern Violence, Singapore University Press, Singapore. See also the
reports by the International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,
Asia Report No 98, 18 May 2005, and Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,
Asia Report No 129, 15 March 2007.
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It would appear, then, to be the simplest of questions: who are the
people at the centre of the violent conflict in Thailand’s ‘three southern
provinces’?2 Judging by the coverage of the issue by the Thai and
international media, the statements by the Thai and Malaysian govern-
ments, and the work of a large number of academics, particularly those
in the field of security studies whose opinions have been eagerly sought,
most appear to have concluded: ‘Muslims’. The Thai government will
often add an adjective to this collective name to affirm this group’s
nationality: ‘Thai Muslims’ (or less correctly, though a term still widely
used, ‘Thai Islam’). The perception of the conflict as being religious in
nature is particularly strong in Thailand. One has only to look at the
Thai media coverage of the violence since early 2004, the regular
seminars organized to promote interreligious understanding, concerns
expressed to the Thai authorities by the Malaysian government about
the ‘Muslims of southern Thailand’, and visits to Thailand in 2005 by
representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as
well as the heads of Indonesia’s two major religious organizations,
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Merely by the use of these
religious labels to represent the actors involved in conflict, despite the
Thai government’s attempts to characterize the conflict as not a
religious one, it is difficult for the Thai public to imagine it otherwise.
Since the conflict has tended to be viewed in Thailand predominantly
in religious terms, it is inevitable that the solutions that are offered
tend to be based on religious considerations.3 Yet if the conflict were
religious, it would raise the question as to why hundreds of thousands
of ‘Thai Muslims’ residing outside the three southern provinces where
the violence has been concentrated have not shown greater solidarity
with their co-religionists in their struggle with the Thai state.4 Why
then is this conflict consistently represented today using religious
terminology?
2
‘Sam jangwat phak tai’, the term most commonly used in the Thai commentary on
this issue, referring to the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.
Occasional violence has also occurred in Songkhla province.
3 See the recommendations contained in the NRC’s (2005) report, ‘Raingan
khanakammakan isara phuea khwam samanchan haeng chat: ao chan khwam runraeng
duan khwam samanchan’ (English version: ‘Overcoming violence through the power
of reconciliation: recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission to
the government’, April–September, available at the NRC’s website: http://
www.nrc.or.th/th/.
4 The exact total for the Muslim population in the three southern provinces and the
country as a whole is a subject of much conjecture. Calculated from the 2000 figures
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This paper is an attempt to present a brief historical overview of how
the people in the southern border region have been represented. It will
give particular attention to the struggle between competing discourses
of Thai national identity, pan-Malay ethnic identity, Muslim identity,
and a more localized ‘Patani Malay’ identity centred on the memory of
the former sultanate of Patani and its associated linguistic and cultural
elements.
Pre-nationalist discourses of identity
If one examines the chronicles and other documentary evidence
produced by the Thai court in the second half of the nineteenth and the
early twentieth centuries about the Patani sultanate, as well as the Thai
kingdom’s other Malay dependencies such as Kedah, Kelantan and
Trengganu, it is striking that there is, in fact, relatively little reference
to the cultural identity of the peoples of the region. The narrative is
dominated by the king and his administrative officials and their
counterparts in the vassal states. However, when the people or the
region are distinguished in cultural terms, the word that is used most
frequently is khaek, and less commonly khaek melayu or melayu.5 Khaek
is a more complex term than is often understood. In Thai, the common
literal meaning is ‘guest’. Sathian argues that it derives from a Hokkien
word meaning the same.6 But the term khaek has also long been used
by Thai officials as well as in popular discourse to refer to such diverse
peoples as Malays, people from the Indian subcontinent (of whatever
provided by the Islamic Committee Office of Thailand, Gilquin quotes extraordinar-
ily high figures of 7,391,235 for the country as a whole and 3,454,300 for Pattani,
Yala and Narathiwat combined; Michel Gilquin (2005), The Muslims of Thailand,
trans Michael Smithies, IRASEC and Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, pp 39–40.
Using the official figures, McCargo estimates that Malay Muslims make up approxi-
mately 80% of the total population of the three provinces of 1.8 million, ie 1,440,000;
Duncan McCargo (2006), ‘Introduction: Rethinking Thailand’s southern violence’,
in Critical Asian Studies, p 3.
5 See excerpts from the Thai dynastic chronicles of the First, Second and Third Reigns,
as well as histories of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Pattani compiled by Thai
state officials, in Paramin Khrueathong, ed (2005), Sayam-Pattani nai tamnan kan
to su melayu muslim [Siam-Pattani in the History of the Struggle of the Malay
Muslims], Sinlapawathanatham, Bangkok. See also Chulalongkorn’s (1964)
reference to khaek and melayu in Raya thang sadet phra ratchadamnoen praphat
thank bo thang ruea rop laem melau ratanakosin sok 109 [Royal Journal by Land
and Sea Around the Malay Peninsula 1891], Vols 1 & 2, Khurusapha, Bangkok.
6 Mala Rajo Sathian, ‘Rights over men to rights over land: the economy of Pattani and
the Thai state (1880–1920)’, unpublished manuscript, p 173, fn 28.
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religion), Persians, Muslims generally, and others.7 However, today
the term is regarded as derogatory by Muslims of the southern border
provinces due to its association with the notion of ‘guest’ status in the
Thai kingdom. In official Thai discourse today, khaek has thus been
replaced with the term ‘Muslim’ as a gesture of political correctness.
Yet Muslims of the middle and upper southern region still often
willingly identify themselves as khaek with no sense of the term being
derogatory.
It is notable that in the Thai court documents of the nineteenth
century Islam scarcely receives a mention, nor are the inhabitants
referred to as ‘Muslims’. The chronicle (phongsawadan) of Patani
written by a Thai official Phraya Wichiankhiri in the late nineteenth
century contains a revealing passage referring to the famous legend of
Lim Toh Khiam, a Chinese adventurer who settles in Patani some time
in the sixteenth century, becomes famous for manufacturing cannons
for the Patani raja, and eventually converts to Islam. But the Thai
author of the chronicle renders his conversion in this way:
‘. . . the person who created these three cannons is thought to have
been a Chinese from China. He was a Hokkien called Lim, first name
Khiam. He settled at Kaseh village. This Chinese man Khiam married a
Malay woman and so converted to the Malay religion. So the Malays
refer to him until today as “Lim Toh Khiam”.’8
It seems then that for the Thais, the terms melayu or khaek already
signified people of a different religion.
As the region is brought under closer control of the Thai court in the
latter part of the reign of King Chulalongkorn, we see the first appear-
ance of the idea of ‘Thai-ification’ as a tool of government. Among the
recommendations that Prince Damrong, Head of the Ministry of the
Interior, made in a report to the King in 1896 was that the government
should attempt to ‘cultivate’ local administrators who were ‘Thai both
7 On the use of the term khaek by the Thai court in the first half of the nineteenth
century, see Davisakd Puaksom (2003), Khon plaek na nanachat krung sayam nai
khlong tang phasa thi wat pho [University in Stone]: ngan khian choeng
chatiphanwanana [ethnography] chin raek khong sayam [International Strangers in
Siam in the Verses on Different Languages at Wat Pho (University in Stone): Siam’s
First Ethnography], Sinlapawathanatham, Bangkok.
8 Paramin, supra note 5, at p 42 (emphasis added).
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in mind and manners’.9 Yet even after the abolition of the Patani
sultanate, the exile and imprisonment of its last sultan, Abdulkadir
Kamaruddin, and the definitive absorption of the territories of the former
sultanate into the Thai state under the 1909 Anglo–Siamese Treaty, the
Thai court could still refer to the region’s inhabitants as ‘Malay’.
According to Kobkua, the King aimed eventually to achieve a situation in
which ‘even though they are Malays and of a different faith . . . [they]
are Thais in sentiment and outlook just as any other Thai. . .’10 Thus it
seemed possible then, still under the Absolute Monarchy, for the Thai
government to recognize dual identities within one state, ‘Thai’ and
‘Malay’ (or khaek).
As for the Patani historiographical tradition, the Patani chronicle
known as Hikayat Patani, the most important source for subsequent
Malay historiography about Patani’s early history, refers only rarely to
‘Malay’.11 It is essentially a narrative about Patani’s rajas and court
officials, and its relations with Ayuthaya and the other Malay sultanates of
the peninsula, not about a ‘people’. While Islam is certainly a defining
feature of the chronicle – the conversion of the raja to Islam is a major
event at the beginning of the chronicle – as in the Thai chronicles
referred to above, there is very little reference to ‘Muslims’. The Hikayat
Patani is also noteworthy for the apparent lack of animosity its author
displays towards Siam, and the close, if not always smooth, relations
between Ayuthaya and Patani. In an early section, King Mudhaffar Syah
deliberates with his officials regarding a proposed visit to Ayudhya:
‘What would you say if We went to Ayudhya, for the king is no stranger
to Us, and after all, two countries are better than one’.12 While the
9 Panngam Gothammasarn (1976), ‘The administration of the seven southern prov-
inces during King Chulalongkorn’s reign’, unpublished MA thesis, Department of
History, Chulalongkorn University, pp 159–175, quoted in Davisakd Puaksom (2008),
‘Of a lesser brilliance: Patani historiography in contention’, in Michael J. Montesano
and Patrick Jory, eds, The Plural Peninsula: Studies in the History of Ethnic Inter-
actions in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia, NUS Press, Singapore, and
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
10 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian (2004), ‘Question of identity of the Muslims in southern
Thailand: a comparative examination of responses of the Sam-Sams in Satun and of
the Thai Malay Muslims in the three provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani to
Thailand’s quest for national identity’, paper presented at the Workshop, A Plural
Peninsula: Historical Interactions Among the Thai, Malays, Chinese and Others,
Walailak University, 5–7 February, pp 178–192 (emphasis added).
11 A. Teeuw, and David K. Wyatt – trans (1970), Hikayat Patani: The Story of Patani,
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
12 Ibid, p 155.
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chronicle records Patani’s relations with Kelantan, Kedah, Pahang and
Johore, there is little explicit sense conveyed of a common ‘Malay’
identity. Indeed, when Raja Léla of Patani makes a trip to Johore, he
admits to his host, ‘. . . I am a foreigner . . . I do not know the Malay
rules for conduct. If I make any silly mistakes I ask you to teach me the
correct behaviour.’13
The struggle for ‘Patani Malays’ and ‘Thai Muslims’
The representation of the people of Thailand’s southern border
provinces changes significantly with the rise of nationalism on both
sides of the border from the 1920s and 30s. In Thailand following the
overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 1932, the new nationalist
governments progressively sought to shift the concept of political
loyalty from the person of the king to the Thai nation. Similarly, in the
case of British Malaya, the rise of Malay nationalism, particularly
after the founding of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
in the 1940s, meant that the political loyalties of the Malays were owed
to the bangsa melayu rather than to the Malay sultans or the British
colonial government.14 The peoples of the territories of the former
sultanate of Patani thus appear to have been caught between these two
forms of nationalism.
It is Malay nationalism that is the dominant theme in the most
influential Patani Malay nationalist text that has been written, Ibrahim
Syukri’s Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani [History of the Malay
Kingdom of Patani]. For the author of this popular nationalist history
published in Malay in the early 1950s, the subject of his narrative was
the ‘Patani Malays’.15 While Syukri relied significantly on the Hikayat
Patani as a source, his protagonists have changed from the rajas of the
Patani court to the Malay people. The dominant theme of the work is
the antagonistic relations between the ‘Siam-Thai’ and the ‘Patani
Malays’. For Syukri, Siam is an imperial, colonizing power and the
intention of its kings is to ‘subjugate Patani and enslave its people’.16
13 Teeuw and Wyatt, supra note 11, at p 192.
14 Anthony Reid (2004), ‘Understanding melayu as a source of diverse modern identi-
ties’, in Timothy Barnard, ed, Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Borders,
Singapore University Press, Singapore, p 17.
15 Ibrahim Syukri (2005), History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani [Sejarah Kerajaan
Melayu Patani], translated by Conner Bailey and John N. Miksic, Silkworm Books,
Bangkok.
16 Ibid, p 58.
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When the Patani sultanate is divided in the early nineteenth century,
Syukri writes, ‘It was split up by the Raja of Siam with the intention of
weakening the strength of the Malays in order to make it easy for him
to rule and enslave the Malays according to the principles of
colonization (imperialism); that is, ‘divide and rule’.17 The theme of
national liberation is strongest towards the end of the book when Syukri
calls for the recognition of the ‘nationality [of the population of Patani]
as a Malay people’:
‘Among the 100 million Malay people of the world, the Malays of
Patani are the most ill-fated. Even though the Malay people of Patani
long have lived in the democratic world, because Siam-Thai
democracy is limited, the fate of the Malay people is like a climbing
vine unable to grow up the trellis.
In truth the fate of the Patani Malay people should not be placed in
the hand of the Siam-Thai government. Rather, measures to improve
their fate and condition should be place in their own hands.’18
The influence of Syukri’s work and the Patani Malay nationalism that
inspired it cannot be underestimated. Patani Malay nationalism is the
motivating theme for numerous other historical texts on Patani, written
in both Thai and Malay published on both sides of the border, as well
as in English, up until recent times.19
Following the end of the Second World War, as Malay nationalism
was gathering momentum across the border and Thailand was forced
by the British to give up its irredentist annexations during the war (the
Shan states, Laos, Cambodia and the northern Malay states), a group
of Malay leaders in the Patani region submitted a petition to the British
requesting the British government to ‘have the kindness to release our
17 Syukri, supra note 15, at p 64.
18 Syukri, supra note 15, at p 101.
19 See for example Nik Anuar (1999), Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani 1785–1954
[History of the Struggle of the Patani Malays, 1785–1954], Penerbit Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, cited in Sathian, supra note 6, at p 15; or Bangnara
(1976), Patani: adit lae patchuban [Patani: Past and Present], Chomrom Saengthian,
Bangkok, cited in Davisakd, supra note 9. The ongoing influence of Syukri’s book
and the Patani nationalism it inspired is also apparent in a recent paper presented at
Lund University by a descendant of the Patani royal family, Tengku Ismail C. Denudom
(2005), entitled ‘Politics, economy, identity or religious striving for the Malay Patani:
a case study of the conflicts between Thailand and the Malay state of Patani’, Dept
of East and Southeast Asia Languages, Lund University. On the competing Thai and
Malay historiographies on Patani, see Davisakd, supra note 9.
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country and ourselves from the pressure of Siam,’ since they did not
wish to ‘remain any longer under the Siamese Government’. For Patani,
they pointed out, ‘is really a Malay country, formerly ruled by Malay
Rajas for generations’.20 The year 1948 saw the establishment in Kelantan
of GAMPAR, the Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya, or Greater Patani
Malay Association, supported by Tengku Mahyiddin, youngest son of
the last sultan of Patani, which sought political union with Malaya.
Moreover, the political ideology of the most prominent of the region’s
separatist organizations that sprang up soon afterwards, such as the
Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO),21 the Barisan Nasional
Pembebsan Patani (Patani National Liberation Front, or BNPP) and
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani Malay National
Revolutionary Front, or BRN), has been the national liberation of the
‘Patani Malays’.
Since the era of de-colonization and the formation of nation-states
following the Second World War, we see the emergence of the ‘Patani
Malays’ as a subject of political and scholarly discourse. It is remark-
able how little reference there is to their religious identity. How then
have the subjects of the conflict been transformed from ‘Malays’ into
‘Muslims’? The answer can be found partly in the appearance of three
new, though separate, discourses that have impacted upon the identity
of the inhabitants of the former Patani sultanate.
First, since the era of de-colonization and the rise of Malay national-
ism in British Malaya, the Thai government has actively sought to avoid
references to the Malay ethnic identity of the subjects of the region. It
feared that with the new, post-colonial logic of nation-based states,
recognition of the people of the region as ‘Malay’ would give
credibility to demands for a separate Malay state, either based on the
territories of the old Malay sultanate of Patani, or through union with
the other Malay states of British Malaya, which were now preparing
for independence from Britain. In much the same way and for the same
reasons, the Lao identity of the inhabitants of the north-east was
officially erased as the Thai state created a new name by which they
would be formally known, ‘Isan’. Similarly, the Chinese were forced
to declare their allegiance to the Thai state through a name change, by
abandoning their Chinese names and replacing them with Thai ones.
The State Cultural Directives (ratthaniyom) of the first Phibun
20 Davisakd, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
21 In Malay, Pertubuhan Persatuan Pembebasan Patani (PPPP).
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government (1938–46) banned official references to ethnic identity.22
Under the assimilationist policies of national integration that began in
Thailand during the Phibun period and held sway through to the 1990s,
Malay ethnic identity as expressed in terms of language, dress,
education, history and custom was consistently discouraged by the state.23
The government has attempted to replace it with a religious label, ‘Thai
Muslims’ or ‘Thai Islam’, in the hope that this linguistic change would
contribute to the overall goal of assimilation. Thus for the Thai
government, the only possible identity officially acceptable for the former
‘Patani Malays’ within the Thai nation-state since the Phibun era has
been as ‘Thai Muslims’.
Islamization in Malaysia
But discourses of Thai national identity and the government’s programme
of cultural assimilation are only part of the answer. Another is the
politicization of Islam amongst the Malays in neighbouring Malaysia.
Although this process first becomes clearly visible in the 1970s, its
seeds were sown with the establishment of the state of Malaysia and
the legal definition of Malayness. One of the components of Malay
identity as defined by the Malaysian Constitution was ‘a person who
professes the religion of Islam’.24 Following Malaysia’s independence
in 1957, therefore, to be a Malay – and thereby eligible for the special
privileges accorded to ‘Malays’ – legally one must be a Muslim.
Yet up until the 1970s, Islam is not central to most discussions of
Malay identity. Reading Mahathir’s controversial The Malay Dilemma,
published in 1970, it is striking that Islam receives hardly any
22 See Craig J. Reynolds, ed (1991), National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand
1939–89, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai.
23 The Thai education system played a crucial role in this policy of assimilation. A
colleague from Narathiwat province once told me of his experience as a student in a
Thai government school in Narathiwat, where in place of the legends of Malay
cultural heroes such as Hang Tuah he had learnt about while in the pondok, he was
obliged to read Sang Thong and other classics of the Thai literary canon.
24 Article 60 of the Malaysian Constitution defines ‘Malay’ as follows: ‘“Malay” means
a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language,
conforms to Malay custom and – was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or
in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in
Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or is the
issue of such a person.’ (Virginia Matheson Hooker (2004), ‘Malay and Islam in
Contemporary Malaysia’, in Timothy P. Barnard, ed, Contesting Malayness: Malay
Identity Across Borders, Singapore University Press, Singapore, p 158; emphasis
added).
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attention. The bulk of the book concentrates on Malay cultural traits
that were supposedly responsible for the ‘dilemma’ in which, accord-
ing to Mahathir, the Malays now found themselves.
The insecurity of the Malays, barely a majority ‘in their own land’
and economically disadvantaged compared with the Chinese and
Indians, received violent expression in the deadly 1969 race riots in
which hundreds were killed in clashes between Malays and Chinese.
The government later enacted the New Economic Policy, which aimed
at raising the socioeconomic status of Malays vis-à-vis the other races
through a systematic affirmative action policy directed towards the
Malays. Meanwhile student activism in Malaysia began to take on an
Islamic face. The most prominent organization was ABIM, the Malaysian
Muslim Youth Movement, led by the charismatic student, Anwar
Ibrahim. The movement called for an end to the rural poverty and
neglect of the Malays, and an enhanced role for Islam in Malay society
and politics. Anwar’s radicalism led to his arrest and detention under
the ISA in 1974–75.
On becoming Prime Minister in 1981, Mahathir began to implement
his own policy of Islamization, despite his credentials as secular
nationalist odernizer. A year later, he co-opted Anwar into the
government. Between them a policy emerged that viewed Islam as the
answer to ‘social ills’ – corruption, laziness, materialism, drug
addiction, promiscuity, incest, child abuse – which appeared to be more
prevalent among the Malays than the other ethnic groups, and which
were blamed on the government’s policy of rapid economic develop-
ment.25 It is from this era that the government begins to promote Islam
as a solution to these problems and to exhort Malays to obey and live
out the teachings of Islam. Islamic discourse in Malaysia, therefore,
became dominated by the government, a task that was made easier by
its stranglehold on political power due to the racialized nature of
Malaysian politics and its control of the mass media. Ironically, there-
fore, the two key figures in the Islamization of Malay society were
politicians, Mahathir and Anwar, rather than trained Islamic scholars.
Indeed, it is interesting that neither Mahathir nor Anwar, the authors of
the government’s Islamization campaign, had had any solid Islamic
education, but rather received their schooling in the Western
educational tradition. Mahathir graduated in medicine from Singapore’s
King Edward VII Medical College, while Anwar attended the
25 Hooker, supra note 24, at pp 153–156.
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prestigious English public school, Malay College Kuala Kangsar, rather
than a pondok, before entering the University of Malaya where he read
Malay studies, not Islam.
It could have been possible for the Malaysian government, like the
governments of other developing countries, to promote ‘traditional
values’ as a remedy for the social problems associated with economic
modernization, yet Islam was chosen instead. Why? Even as a Malay
nationalist, Mahathir in fact had a problematic relationship with Malay
identity.26 It could be said that no-one was more critical of the Malays
than Mahathir. He was especially scathing of traditional Malay values
– modesty, self-effacement, adherence to good manners and lack of
interest in material advancement, which, according to Mahathir, had
led to Malay ‘backwardness’ in comparison with other ethnic groups,
especially the Chinese, and could even be seen as having contributed
to the colonization of the Malays by the British.27 So he turned to Islam
– but not just any Islam. The Islam promoted by Mahathir and Anwar,
according to Hooker, was more akin to a ‘civil religion’, ‘expressed in
a language that is more secular than Islamic’. Hooker compares it to
the Christianity of America since the industrial revolution, that is, a
religion that was ‘activist, moralistic and socially oriented, rather than
being contemplative, theological and innerly spiritual [. . .] There are
no references to Islam as a means to salvation in the next world – the
focus is on what Islam can do for its followers here and now.’28 In this
respect, as Kamaruzzaman shows, the Malaysian government’s new
campaign of Islam Hadhari, or ‘Islamic Civilization’, announced by
Mahathir’s successor Abdullah Badawi,29 is in the same spirit as the
early campaigns under Mahathir.30
26 Perhaps also partly due to his own mixed ancestry.
27 Mahathir Mohamed (1970), The Malay Dilemma, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala
Lumpur.
28 Hooker, supra note 24, at pp 159–163.
29 It is said by local residents in the southern Thai border provinces that some of Badawi’s
forebears came from Patani. One recent biography traces his ancestors from ‘south-
ern Siam’, and more specifically Setul; Syed Ali Taufik Al Attas, and Ng Tieh Chuan
(2005), Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Revivalist of an Intellectual Tradition, Pelanduk
Publications, Subang Jaya, pp 31–38, while another work states that Badawi had at
least one ancestor said to be from Patani: see Zulkiple Abd. Ghani, Othman Talib,
Farid Mat Zain, and Ezad Azraai Jamsari (2006), Syeikh Abdullah Fahim: Ulama
Melayu Progresif, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, pp 2–3. My thanks to
Abdulrazak Panaemalae for this information.
30 Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad (2006), ‘Voices of Islam in SEA after 11
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However, for Mahathir, Islam also fulfilled another important
function. It provided a useful alternative ideological basis for a
Malaysian critique of Western ‘imperialism’ and neo-colonialism, in
place of the Marxist conceptual framework and language that was
common to anticolonial movements and sentiment in most newly
independent Third World countries, and to which Mahathir was
vehemently opposed. Mahathir later emerged as a leading Third World
critic of the West, using a mixture of anticolonial rhetoric – which
appealed to post-colonial societies globally – and called for a revival
of Islamic values – which appealed to Muslim countries in particular.
This critique only increased in appeal after the success of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979, and especially following the end of the
Cold War.
At the same time, besides the official UMNO brand of Islam
developed by Mahathir and Anwar and sponsored by the central
government apparatus, an alternative Malay political party and UMNO’s
main rival for the Malay vote, the Parti Islam se Malaysia, or PAS, was
also promoting its own brand of Islam. Significantly, this party’s heart-
land was in Kelantan, which is geographically and linguistically, not to
mention historically, closely related to the Patani Malays. This link is
important. Close ties between the two peoples go back at least as far as
the late seventeenth century when, following the fall of the Kota Maligai
dynasty, Patani came under the rule of rajas descended from the
Kelantanese dynasty. In 1842, following a decade of revolt and turmoil
in Siam’s Malay dependencies, the Thai rulers themselves installed a
member of the Kelantanese dynastic line as raja of Patani; and follow-
ing his imprisonment in Phitsanulok after the abolition of the Patani
sultanate in the early twentieth century, the former sultan Abdulkadir
Kamarrudin went into exile in Kelantan, where he died. Today the
border with Kelantan is marked by the Kolok River, and people can
September: “Islam Hadhari” and “Islam Liberal”’, Workshop Proceedings, Voices of
Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia, International Workshop, 20–22 January, Walailak
University, Nakhon Si Thammarat, pp 86–100. The 10 principles of Islam Hadhari
are as follows: (1) faith and piety in Allah; (2) just and trustworthy government; (3)
freedom and independence to the people; (4) mastery of knowledge; (5) balanced
and comprehensive economic development; (6) good quality of life for all; (7) pro-
tection of the rights of minority groups and women; (8) cultural and moral integrity;
(9) protection of the environment; (10) strong defence policy. If one changed just
one word – ‘Allah’ to ‘God’ – then these 10 principles could be the wish list for
virtually any modernizing country in the world, no matter what the religion of its
citizens.
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cross the river and the border with relative ease. Close kinship ties
exist between the peoples on both sides of the border, and many PAS
leaders in Kelantan have relatives there.31 Separatist organizations have
long enjoyed close links with Kelantan.32
Farish Noor has discussed the changes in PAS’s political ideology
and the rise of the party ‘from the ashes’ under the presidency of Yusof
Rawa in the 1980s.33 From the Party’s roots in anticolonialism, Malay
ethno-nationalism and even leftism, Yusof Rawa began a major trans-
formation of its ideology by promoting what is now popularly called
an ‘Islamist’ agenda. Secular ‘ethno-nationalism’ (Arabic: asabiyyah)
came under severe criticism as having demonstrably failed the Muslim
world in the decades following de-colonization. It was said to be
un-Islamic, a product not of a primordial essence, but a remnant of
colonialism that had divided the umma. Ethno-nationalism should thus
be seen as a throwback to the age of jahiliyyah (ignorance) before the
coming of Islam. In one speech, he argued:
‘The Malay people have become backward thanks to the practice of
asabiyyah which is oppressive and corrupt. Efforts to help the Malays
will fail because of the corruption and oppression (that accompanies
this form of communitarian politics), and so such corruption must be
resisted and destroyed for good. This tyrannical form of asabiyyah
is the root cause of the backwardness and suffering of the people.’34
He argued that the Party’s previous adoption of ‘forms of communitarian
politics had merely led to divisions within the Muslim ummah and were
the cause of the Islamic Party’s lack of direction during the 1970s’.35
PAS’s rejection of ethnic politics from the 1980s thus clearly distin-
guished PAS’s political ideology from the Malay nationalism of the
ruling UMNO party. Yusoff Rawa’s presidency also saw the rise of the
ulama to positions of power in the Party apparatus, giving them a much
more prominent role in the Party than ever before.36
31
‘Bahrun’ (2005), Yihat si thao: khrai sang khrai liang fai tai [Grey Jihad: Who Started
and Who is Stoking the Southern Fire] Sarika, Bangkok, p 93.
32 International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, International
Crisis Group, Brussels, pp 7–10.
33 Farish A. Noor (2004), Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party PAS (1951–2003), Vol 2, Malaysian Sociological Research
Institute, Kuala Lumpur, p 349 ff.
34 Quoted in Noor, supra note 33, at p 354.
35 Noor, supra note 33, at p 352.
36 Noor, supra note 33, at pp 350–356.
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Under PAS, which has been in power since 1959 for all but nine
years, Malay society in Kelantan has been Islamized to a greater extent
than ever before. Shadow-play, once one of the traditional icons of
Malay culture throughout the Malay world, has almost disappeared,
discouraged by the religious authorities on the grounds that it is un-
Islamic. The rare performances that do take place, once an official permit
has been obtained from the government, have been cleansed of their
Hindu–Buddhist symbolism. Yet as Noor argues, PAS’s policies of
Islamization could not have been possible without UMNO’s state-
sponsored Islamization programme.37 He describes the situation as an
‘Islamization Race’ between UMNO and PAS, which has reduced the
‘discursive space’ for other conceptions of Malaysian society and
politics, especially in the Malay Muslim community.38 The debate about
the implementation of shariah, and especially PAS’s professed desire
to bring in hudud penal law, can thus be seen in this context of trying to
‘out-Islamize’ its rival, UMNO.39 It was out of this competition with
PAS that Mahathir was able to claim controversially in September 2001
that Malaysia was now an ‘Islamic State’.40
Thus when Patani Malays look today to their Malay brothers and
sisters in Malaysia, whether in neighbouring Kelantan41 or Malaysia as
a whole, they see a more Islamized Malay identity; 42 and in the case of
PAS’s Kelantan, the ethnic basis of Malay identity has been all but
rejected politically in favour of an Islamic identity.
37 Noor, supra note 33, at p 751.
38 Noor, supra note 33, at pp 724–725.
39 Noor, supra note 33, at pp 725–730.
40 On the debate as to whether or not Malaysia can be termed an ‘Islamic state’, see
Abdul Razak Baginda, and Peter Schier, eds (2005), Malaysia: An Islamic State?
Secularism and Theocracy: A Study of the Malaysian Constitution, ASEAN
Academic Press, London.
41 I am unaware of any scholarly study that has looked closely at PAS’s influence in the
provinces of southern Thailand, despite the fact that PAS leaders frequently comment in
the media about the situation in southern Thailand, and Party leaders including PAS
Chief Minister in Kelantan, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, are well known in the southern Thai
provinces and have travelled there on numerous occasions.
42 A poll taken of 1,029 people in peninsular Malaysia by the Muslim Identities
Public Opinion Survey in 2006 revealed a surprising result: when asked if they
had to assume a single identity, what would that be, 73% of respondents saw them-
selves as ‘Muslims’, 14% as ‘Malaysian’, with only 13% as ‘Malay’; ‘Poll shows
73% think we are Islamic state’, The Sun, 5 September 2006, in World Wide
Religious News, Website: http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=22626&sec=
33&cont=all.
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‘De-culturalization’ of Islam in southern Thailand
Between the Thai policy of assimilation and Malaysian programmes of
Islamization across the border, one might well ask to what extent a
Patani Malay identity still exists among the locals of the ‘three
southern provinces’. There are few empirical data on which to base an
answer to this important question. In fact, the very problem of the lack
of primary data from the region due to the ongoing violence is a crucial
methodological obstacle hindering a better understanding of what is
actually happening in lower southern Thailand.43 Anecdotally, it is said
that fluency in the Patani Malay (or Yawi) dialect among the young has
decreased compared with a generation ago, and that competence in
Thai has increased. Students from the southern border provinces studying
at Walailak University where I teach will usually affirm (out of habit?)
their ‘Thainess’. While most are fluent in Thai, their Yawi accents are
quite noticeable and they will speak in dialect to friends from the same
region. Some anthropological work suggests that Muslim youths from
the Thai border provinces working in Malaysia will talk to each other
in Thai.44 A half-century of assimilationist policies carried out by the
Thai government must surely have had some effect. Yet many people
from the region travel to Malaysia and some to Indonesia for
educational and employment purposes, which exposes them to an
alternative ‘Malay’ cultural milieu. Another cultural influence in the
region that has increased is Arabic, as students return from their studies in
the Middle East, or as a result of funding provided by Arab states for
religious and educational purposes.45 Some female Muslim students at
Islamic colleges in the southern border provinces have adopted the full
veil that covers the whole face apart from the eyes, a style of dress that
43 The difficulty is manifold: the uncertain security situation; fear on the part of the
locals of the consequences of divulging information to unknown outsiders, and the
lack of familiarity with the local dialect and culture on the part of most researchers.
Given such methodological obstacles, one would wish for more humility on the part
of many academics in their representations of the situation in the south.
44 Mala Rajoo Sathian and Saroja Doraraijoo (2002), ‘Being melayu the Thai way:
perceiving the Thai–Malay border from a people’s perspective’, paper presented at
the 9th International Thai Studies Conference, 9–12 June, Nakhon Phanom.
45 Here we should be just as careful not to essentialize a monolithic, unchanging
‘Arabic’ culture that is sometimes inherent in critiques of the so-called ‘Arabization’
of South East Asian Islam.
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was previously unknown in the local Malay culture. The influence of
so-called ‘Wahabi’ religious orthodoxy, for example, in the perform-
ance of daily prayers, has in some cases clashed with ‘traditional Malay’
religious practices. It has split some communities, and in some cases
has led to people praying in separate congregations.46
Numerous studies point to social problems prevalent among the youth
in the region, including drug addiction and involvement in violence
and petty crime. One wonders whether one of the sources of the
violence might be an identity crisis among young men of the region
resulting from the obliteration of Patani Malay identity over the last
100 years, resistance to the full adoption of a Thai identity (given its
association with discrimination and oppression) and the attraction of a
radicalized Islam to fill the void. The French scholar of Muslim society in
Europe, Olivier Roy, argues that one of the reasons for extremism among
some young European Muslims is their rejection of the traditional
culture of their parents, their inability to find acceptance in the main-
stream cultures of Europe,47 and their refuge in a purified reconstruction
of an ‘imagined’ Islam. ‘The more radical the terrorists, the more they
do not embody a traditional culture or a culture at all. Islamic
radicalization is a consequence of “de-culturalization” and not the
expression of a pristine culture.’48 Roy’s argument thus raises the
question of whether a similar phenomenon of de-culturalization, albeit
caused by different factors, may be a contributing factor to the radical-
ism in Thailand’s south:
‘The generation gap, coupled with a sense of disenfranchising [. . .]
individualization of faith, self-teaching, generation gap, rejection of
authority (including that of religious established leaders), loosening
of family ties, lack of socialization with a broader community
(including the ethnic community of their parents), and withdrawal
46 Personal communication from Abdulrazak Panaemalae, who is currently undertak-
ing a research project on this issue. While the term ‘Wahabi’ has recently come into
use, other terms used to indicate ‘modernist’ Islamic practice in the region include
the Malay ‘kaum muda’, or in Thai, ‘khana mai’.
47 In fact, these ‘mainstream cultures’ have themselves been undergoing a transition at
the very moment of large-scale Muslim immigration, with the gradual weakening of
the nation-states and the national identities they nurtured as a result of the project of
European integration, and more generally, globalization.
48 Olivier Roy (2005), ‘A clash of cultures or a debate on Europe’s values?’ Inter-
national Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) Review, Vol 15,
spring, pp 5–6.
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towards a small inward-looking group akin to a cult: all these factors
show the extent of the process of deculturation of the radicals.’49
If a Patani Malay identity is indeed in crisis, then that may also explain
why the separatist organizations such as PULO, the BRN and Bersatu,
whose political ideologies were originally based, as argued above, on
national liberation rather than Islam, seem only tangentially involved
in the conflict that has erupted since the beginning of 2004.50 Despite
repeated claims by the government, it is quite unclear to what extent, if
at all, separatism is a goal of the militants. Indeed, one of the puzzling
aspects of the conflict is the ambiguity regarding the objectives of the
militants, which is perhaps a symptom of the confused ideology of the
movement in the midst of the void left by the obliteration of Patani
Malay identity.
One of the most trenchant critiques of Patani Malay identity comes
from a former militant, now a columnist writing in Thai for the
national news magazine Nation Weekly under the pen-name, ‘Bahrun’.51
Unlike most Thai academics whose target was the Thai government
and its insensitive treatment of the local community, Bahrun’s main
target is the Malay nationalist ideology of the resistance movements in
southern Thailand involved in the violence. To illustrate the deep roots
of Malay nationalism in the region in one of his columns, he recalls his
days as a student in a pondok in Patani, where his superiors would
warn him never to trust the Muslim students from other provinces who
could not speak Malay. It was not surprising, therefore, that the
Muslims of the three southern provinces should see themselves as
distinct from the rest of Thailand, a mindset that supports separatist
sentiment. Bahrun sees exclusivist attitudes such as these as the legacy
of values instilled by Patani’s former traditional rulers.52 He is
particularly critical of academics (both Muslim and non-Muslim) for
continually resorting to history, particularly ‘Patani’s glorious past’, to
explain the troubles in the south. He regards history as one of the main
factors behind an enduring Malay chauvinism (khlang chat) that fuels
49 Ibid, p 7
50 Nidhi Eeosiwong, ‘Understanding the situation in the south as a “Millenarian
Revolt”’, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Vol 6, available at Website: http://
kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac..jp/issue/issue5/index.html.
51 See especially ‘Ngao atalak melayu patani’ [Shadow of Patani Malay identity], in
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at pp 29–40.
52
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at p 32.
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militancy.53 An even more serious charge he makes is that it is the
influence of such radical Malay nationalism that has led to the
distortion of Islamic teaching, seen for example in the controversial
manual allegedly used by some of the militants, Berjihad di Patani:54
‘The most important aspect about this mobilization of Muslim
leaders and organizations is that they do not seem to realize that they
are being ideologically led to create a distorted picture of Islam, caused
by the force of the collision of Malay nationalism. This is one of the
worst sins.’55
In several of Bahrun’s columns, one can see the influence of the
Islamic discourse that rejects ethno-nationalism, the prominent theme
in PAS’s political discourse discussed above. Bahrun even refers
explicitly to the well known commentary on the Qur’an by the
Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb, in which this idea is
developed.56 The danger is in letting Islam become ‘enchained’ by Malay
identity.57 Thus at the very moment that prominent Thai academics such
as Nidhi Eeosiwong58 and Chaiwat Satha-Anand59 are calling for the
53
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at pp 35–36, 105–106, 161. He is particularly critical of the
government-appointed National Reconciliation Council, which he views as ‘lost in
the history of the Malay kingdom and Malay identity’; p 121.
54
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at p 109.
55
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at p 77.
56
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at p 84.
57
‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at p 191.
58 In 2006, Nidhi Eeosiwong’s ‘Midnight University’ network of academics, students
and social activists organized an informal course in ‘Malay Studies’, with lectures
delivered by Thai academics on Malay society as well as the conflict in the south.
Some of these lectures were posted on the network’s Website: http://
www.geocities.com/midarticle/newpage330.html. In May 2006, a seminar on Malay
Studies was organized by Midnight University at the College of Islamic Studies at
Prince Songkhla University, Pattani.
59 Chaiwat is regarded as being the main influence in the report of the National Recon-
ciliation Council released in May 2006, which among other things called for the
government to recognize the local Malay dialect as a ‘working language’. The Chair-
man of the NRC, former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, has also publicly called
for the recognition of the Malay ethnicity of the Muslims in the border provinces in
contrast to then PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s more nationalist line. Following the pub-
lication of the NRC’s report, Gen. Prem Tinasulanond, Chairman of the politically
influential Privy Council and popularly regarded as the King’s spokesman, publicly
rejected the proposal to use Malay as a working language. For Bahrun’s critique of
the National Reconciliation Council, see ‘Bahrun’, supra note 31, at pp 75–82, and
‘Mong prawatisat duai ta nuea’ in Fa Dio Kan, Vol 4, No 2, April–June 2006, pp
107–111.
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Thai government as well as the general public to accept the Malay
ethnic identity of the people of the three southern provinces as part of
the solution to the conflict, a view deriving from a liberal, multicultural
critique of the Thai state’s chauvinistic policies of assimilation, Bahrun
regards the persistence of that ethnic identity (at least as an element in
the ideology of the militants) as one of the principal factors behind the
conflict. It is ironic therefore that the position of Bahrun, a former militant
and presumably a local Muslim of Malay ethnicity, is actually closer60
to that of the Thai state: he argues that it is necessary to de-ethnicize
the conflict by affirming the Islamic identity of the people, and for the
local Muslims to free themselves from the Patani Malay nationalism
that has been so dominant over the last 50 years.
Conclusion
The extent to which the spectre of Patani Malay nationalism still haunts
representations of southern Thailand can be judged by its appearance
in an internationally influential report published by the International
Crisis Group (ICG) in May 2005, Southern Thailand, Insurgency, Not
Jihad. Near the beginning of the report, the author states:
‘The Muslims of southern Thailand are mostly ethnic Malays and
speak Malay, rather than Thai. They were once part of an independ-
ent sultanate of Patani, comprising the present-day provinces of
Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of western Songkhla, that
flourished from 1390 to 1902. That history as a separate political
entity and the second-class status and political neglect the Malay
minority has endured ever since within independent Thailand,
provides the backdrop to the violence today.’61
These sentiments might have come straight out of Ibrahim Syukri’s
Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani published 50 years earlier. Such a
misleading statement on the crucial political question of ‘independ-
ence’ completely fails to account for the long history of Siam’s
overlordship over Patani – albeit a contested overlordship, as was the
60 The difference being, however, that the objective of the Thai state is fostering an
Islam over which it has administrative control.
61 International Crisis Group, supra note 32, at p 2.
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case with Siam’s relations with all its vassal states.62 The ICG goes
even further than Syukri, who dates Patani’s loss of ‘independence’ to
the late eighteenth century, rather than the ICG’s 1902.63 The Hikayat
Patani itself, the key source for the history of Patani–Siamese
relations before the eighteenth century, shows clearly that Patani was
only intermittently free of Siamese political overlordship.64 Moreover,
the first sentence of the above paragraph, for which the ICG cites no
evidence, also ignores the diversity and complexity of ‘Muslim’ and
‘Malay’ identity in southern Thailand, and fails to take into account
those Muslims who do in fact identify themselves as ‘Thai’ and speak
Thai as their first language. It also omits the hundreds of thousands of
Muslims in southern Thailand who live outside the region mentioned
who speak no Malay and have no relationship, sentimental or other-
wise, with the former sultanate of Patani. The Thais appear in the report
mainly in the form of oppressive state security officials, and the ethnic
Chinese, whose presence on the peninsula is ancient and continuous,
are invisible.65
This exclusionist conception of the ‘Malay Muslims’ of southern
Thailand associated with a historically powerful Patani state, which is
characteristic of Patani Malay nationalism, is central to the ideology of
separatism. It can be seen, for example, in a map produced by the Bersatu
separatist organization, which depicts the ‘state’ of Patani (Negara
Patani) coloured in green, covering the entire region of southern
Thailand. The existing provinces, whose present-day boundaries are
62 On how modern notions of national sovereignty disrupted pre-modern ideas of inter-
state relations based on vassal–overlord relations, see Thongchai Winichakul (1994),
Siam Mapped: the History of the Geobody of a Nation, University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu, especially chapters 3, 4 & 5.
63 Syukri, supra note 15, at pp 57–58.
64 According to Teeuw and Wyatt, ‘The Malay story [in the Hikayat Patani] makes it
implicitly clear that Patani acknowledged the sovereignty of Ayudhya already in the
time of Sultan Mudhaffar Syah [in the sixteenth century] . . . The story as it runs . . .
suggests a relationship of dependence and inferiority rather than of equality’; Teeuw
and Wyatt, supra note 11, at p 230. Even Che Man, leader of the umbrella group for
Patani separatist organizations, Bersatu, writes, ‘Ever since the establishment of
Muslim dynasties, the kingdom of Patani seems to have experienced alternate periods of
independence and Siamese control’, Wan Kadir Che Man (1990), Muslim Separa-
tism: the Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Oxford
University Press, Singapore, p 34. On the history of political relations between Siam
and Patani, see Davisakd, supra note 9.
65 On the history of ethnic diversity and interaction on the middle part of the peninsula,
see papers included in the Workshop Proceedings, A Plural Peninsula: Historical
Interactions Among the Thai, Malays, Chinese and Others, Walailak University, 5–
7 February 2004.
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retained on the map, are renamed in Malay.66 Underneath the map is
the rallying cry, Bersatu, Berjuang, Merdeka – ‘Unity, struggle,
freedom’. Bahrun refers to similar extravagant claims made by the BRN
over the southern Thai peninsula stretching as far north as Kho Khot
Kra district in Ranong province, on the basis that these lands once
belonged to ‘Melayu’. 67 The historical evidence for this claim would
seem to be either the pre-Islamic state of Langkasuka, supposedly
centred on the Patani region, or the larger ‘Malay’ empire of Sri Vijaya,
which is believed to have extended as far north as Chaiya in Surat
Thani province, near the northernmost point of the separatist group’s
claim. Thus we see a confused conflation of the notions of ‘Malay’,
‘Islam’ and ‘Patani’ within the framework of Patani Malay nationalist
discourse.
Seen in this light, Thailand’s policy of national integration in the
south may be regarded as an attempt to exorcise this ghost. The official
Thai concept of national identity has stood out from that of many of its
South East Asian neighbours. Whereas Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, even Myanmar, have accepted the theory (if not always the
practice) of dual identities, national and ethnic, since independence,
Thailand maintains an essentially assimilationist model of national
integration. It is revealing that one of the responses to the crisis in the
south was to renew official nationalist campaigns to promote ‘Thainess’.
In the words of one of the most popular nationalist propaganda songs:
‘underneath the Thai flag the whole population is Thai’.68 Within this
66 The map is included in Bunkrom Khongbangsathan (2005), Kan to su khrang sut
thai khong phon ek Chavalit Yongchaiyudh [Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s Last Strug-
gle], Offset Press, Bangkok. The map is unpaginated; it appears after the table of
contents.
67 Bahrun, supra note 31, at pp 172–173. Historical artefacts supposedly dating from
the Sri Vijaya period have been found in Chaiya.
68 The crisis in the south since 2004 has led to a nostalgic revival of nationalistic propa-
ganda songs from the military dictatorship era, including Rak Kan Wai Thoet [Let’s
Love Each Other], whose title is somewhat reminiscent of the name of Thailand’s
former ruling party, ‘Thai Rak Thai’. A re-mixed (but artistically inferior) pop ver-
sion of this assimilationist classic of the 1960s by assorted artists (affiliated with an
entertainment company with close business links to the Thai Rak Thai party) in
response to the crisis in the south can be listened to at the Website: http://
www.kapook.com/musicstation/newmusicstation/play.php?id=4240. (Incidentally, this
is a good example of how decades of statist discourse have created their own mass
market, now exploited by Thailand’s culture industry, which is today far more effi-
cient at producing and disseminating cultural products than its predecessor, the
bureaucracy.) On the subject of Thai rock music and nationalism, see Suradet
Phakphian (2005), ‘Rok rak chat tae chat (chai) mai jam pen tong rak rok’ [Patriotic
rock, but the nation does not need to love rock], Wathanasala, Website: http://
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Thainess, while there is a place for Muslims, it appears there is no
place for Malays, despite the greater tolerance of the state for cultural
diversity since the end of the Cold War and the best efforts of some of
Thailand’s academics.69
Fraser’s study of ‘Malay villagers’ in the Patani region in the 1950s,
caught between assimilationist Thai educational and cultural policies
on the one hand and Malay separatist sentiment on the other, sums up
their predicament nicely:
‘[. . .] The most readily available means of signifying his distinc-
tiveness in the face of increasing contact with the Thais is the Malay
villager’s membership in the Islamic world community. He is unable
to rally around linguistic differences, for these are under direct
attack by the government. Although he insists he is first a Malay and
then a Muslim, he is unable to use his Malay culture as a mark of
distinctiveness, for either he is branded as an irredentist, or he is
unable to define clearly what the distinctive elements of Malay
culture are – other than religion. . .70
Unlike the Malays of the other states of the peninsula, the Patani Malays
were unable to rally around another traditional source of belonging,
their sultan, since the Patani sultanate had been abolished by
Chulalongkorn at the beginning of the twentieth century – and in any
case, the original sultanate had been divided up into seven districts
with their own ruling houses early in the nineteenth century. Bereft of
these markers of communal identity, it would appear natural that
religion should take on an added significance. Fraser had already
noticed the increasing role that religion was playing in the lives of Patani
www.wtnsl.net, 10 December. A Malay version of the song, complete with Malay
lyrics, is also available for the benefit of Malay-speaking Thai nationalists, pro-
duced by the Ratchaphat University of Yala and sung by the artists from the same
university and the Public Relations Department (see Website: http://
www.thaisnews.com/prdnews/peace_song/song_south/song_1.html).
69 For an interesting comparison of the different degrees of success in the integration
of the ethnic Chinese and Malays, see Kasien Tejapira (2006), ‘Jek lae khaek kap
sangkhom thai: phinit panha khon thai muslim chuea sai melayu jak prasopkan khon
thai chuea sai jin’ [The Sino–Thai, Khaek and Thai society: a consideration of the
problem of the Malay Thai Muslims from the experience of Thais of Chinese
descent’, Mahawithayalai thiangkhuen [Midnight University], 22 February, Website:
http://www.midnightuniv.org/midnight2545/document95139.html.
70 Thomas M. Fraser Jr (1966), Fishermen of South Thailand: the Malay Villagers,
Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, p 89.
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men at the time of his writing. He finishes his study by noting an
observation of the ‘old men’ in the village: ‘[. . .] the young men today
are better than we were – they like to talk about religion and to go to
makan pulot. They know that religion is good, especially in hard times.’71
Given the Thai government’s policy of suppressing Patani Malay
identity and assimilating the population as Thai Muslims on one side
of the border, and Malaysian government programmes (implemented
by UMNO nationally and PAS in neighbouring Kelantan) of Islamizing
the Malays on the other, it is not surprising that the language of the
resistance movements in the region has taken on an Islamist hue.72 Yet
since September 2001, and even more so since the outbreak of violence in
the south in January 2004, this Islamic identity that the Thai state had
sought to foster with increasing confidence until quite recently, has
itself come under great suspicion, from the Thai government, other
governments involved in pursuing the ‘war on terror’ and the inter-
national security studies community. Thus, the population of the ‘three
southern provinces’ finds itself in what must be a difficult predicament, in
which a Patani Malay identity is out of the question; adopting a
mainstream Thai identity involves surmounting numerous cultural and
religious obstacles; and embracing an Islamic identity, if expressed too
overtly, places one at acute risk of being branded an ‘Islamic extremist’.
It is tempting to conclude, therefore, that the radicalism that is a
feature of the Islamic discourse of the militants in the southern border
provinces today is a logical outcome of the denial of Patani Malay
identity and the difficulty involved in fully accepting mainstream Thai
identity. But in this Islamic discourse that circulates in southern
Thailand, one can still sense the presence of the spectre of Patani Malay
identity.
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